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 Warlordism persisted, though appearing in a new form, after Jiang Jieshi 
completed the Northern Expedition. A contemporary political commentator ascribed 
this phenomenon to Jiang’s eagerness for military victory and his policy of appointing 
rival military leaders as commanders of the National Revolutionary Army. Warlords 
thus survived and continued to challenge the Nanjing government under the guise of 
armed comrades of the Guomindang (GMD), rendering “national reunification” 
nominal rather than real. The same commentator succinctly pinpointed three features 
of “separatist military rule” (junren geju): first, the elimination of all non-affiliated 
military units within the warlord’s sphere of influence; second, the appropriation of 
both national and local revenues by the warlord, as well as the expending of such 
revenues largely for military purposes; and third, the filling up of all government 
posts, at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, by the warlord’s henchmen (Hua 
Yan, 1932: 10). 
_____________ 
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that symposium for their comments. Special thanks go to John Fitzgerald, Kathryn 
Bernhardt and an anonymous referee for Modern China. They read the manuscript 
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 Chen Jitang’s regime in Guangdong in the 1930s displayed all the above 
characteristics. Although a recent biography of Chen asserts that he “did not have 
control of territories in mind” (meiyou dipan sixiang) (Lin Huaping, 1996: 10), it fails 
to convince. Chen, whom contemporaries referred to as “King of the Southern Skies” 
(Nantianwang), belonged to a new genre of separatist military leaders labeled by 
historians as “residual,” “reformist,” “Guomindang” or “new” warlords (Sheridan, 
1966: 14-16; Lary, 1974:130-31; Hsu, 1995: 540). These warlords saw themselves as 
faithful disciples of Sun Yixian, and professed to carry out reforms based on Sun’s 
teachings. They also pledged allegiance to Jiang Jieshi, but challenged him for 
violation of Sun’s Three People’s Principles whenever conflict of interests arose. 
 Differences existed among these warlords. Chen Jitang, for instance, was 
different from his Guangxi ally, Li Zongren, in the sense that he was parochial in 
outlook. His agenda aimed essentially at “safeguarding Guangdong and providing 
reassurance to the Guangdong people” (baojing anmin). Unsurprisingly, Chen’s 
attitude towards Jiang vacillated, as it was contingent on the extent to which Jiang’s 
policy threatened his domain. In this respect, Chen also differed from Li who was 
persistently anti-Jiang (Shi Jiashun, 1992: 133-34). Notwithstanding differences 
among the warlords, no warlord could have failed to realize the fact that the very 
survival of his regime depended essentially on ready access to the sinews of war. Thus, 
a warlord’s primary concern was to maximize revenue in order to finance his war 
machine. Such an overriding concern was detrimental to the task of realizing whatever 
ideals a warlord might have for the betterment of society.  
 Scholarly studies of the “residual” warlords reveal genuine efforts to achieve 
provincial regeneration. These works suggest that the warlord period was not 
necessarily an era of fruitless strife, but one that permitted and even encouraged 
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development toward modernity in the autonomous regions.  
 Donald Gillin, in his study of Yan Xishan, the Shanxi warlord, highlights Yan’s 
ambitious program of rapid industrialization in the 1930s. To Gillin, Yan’s 
undertaking “raises the possibility that in at least some instances the division of China 
into competing warlord regimes created an environment favorable to economic 
growth, since in order to provide their armies with the latest weapons and other 
necessities warlords were compelled to build factories and otherwise develop the 
productive resources of their domains” (Gillin, 1967: 293-94). Diana Lary similarly 
points out that “[m]any of the most serious attempts to modernise and reconstruct took 
place in the independent regions－in provinces such as Kwangtung, Shansi, Shantung 
and Kwangsi” (Lary, 1974: 17). She presents the Guangxi Clique as “both regionalist 
and nationalist－at the same time” (Lary, 1974: 211), and drives home the point “that 
regionalism and nationalism were not necessarily antagonistic, that they could 
co-exist” (Lary, 1974: 3). In another study of the Guangxi Clique, Eugene William 
Levich reiterates the Clique’s assertion that Jiang Jieshi’s failure to regenerate China 
was “the key factor permitting Japanese aggression” (Levich, 1993: 28). He explains 
how the Clique’s concern for  “the creation of an effective resistance to Japanese 
domination” had brought about “in most respects a good government” in Guangxi in 
the 1930s (Levich, 1993: 23, 255).  
 Admittedly, warlord rule displayed constructive features. Guangdong under Chen 
Jitang was a place of buzzing activities, and there were a number of accomplishments 
that he could be proud of. Apart from giving Guangzhou a modern facelift (Lee, 1936), 
Chen deserves credits for two other remarkable feats. The first was highway 
construction.1 In 1929, Guangdong had only 3,661 kilometers of highways (Deng 
Yanhua, 1929a: 10). By 1935, it had built 17,587 kilometers and ranked first among 
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all provinces with respect to the length of highways completed (Woodhead, 1935: 
241). 2 The second was the suppression of banditry, which was facilitated by the vast 
extension of road mileage and which many old-timers recalled with joy.3 This article 
does not deny the fact that Chen Jitang had made important contributions to 
Guangdong. It purports to show, however, that even a “reformist” warlord like Chen 
was limited in what he could accomplish because of his primary orientation as a 
warlord. 
 Drawing on the fiscal records of Republican Guangdong, this study also 
highlights two points of general interest that are often neglected in studies of “residual 
warlordism” during the Nanjing era (1928-37). The first is that fiscal autonomy, which 
made possible the sustenance of provincial or regional armed forces, was the basis of 
military separatism. The second, related to the first, is that fiscal relations explain 
much of the tension between particular warlord regimes and the central government at 
Nanjing. This article sets out to show how. It starts with a discussion of Chen Jitang’s 
meteoric rise to power, followed by an analysis of the fiscal resources, strategies and 
problems of Chen’s military regime.  
 
BUILDING A WARLORD REGIME: CHEN JITANG’S QUEST FOR SUPREMACY IN 
GUANGDONG 
 
STRIVING TO BECOME “KING OF THE SOUTHERN SKIES”  
 Chen Jitang joined the army after graduating from the Guangdong Short-term 
Military School in 1913. He started his military career as a platoon commander in 
1914, became company commander in 1918, battalion commander in 1919, regiment 
commander in 1922, brigade commander in 1923 and division commander in 1925. 
He was further promoted to commander of the Fourth Army of the National 
Revolutionary Army in 1928.4  
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 Fortuitous circumstances made Chen the top military man in Guangdong in the 
spring of 1929. This happened shortly after Jiang Jieshi detained Guangdong’s 
paramount leader, Li Jishen, for alleged conspiracy with the New Guangxi Clique. A 
meeting comprising Jiang Jieshi, Gu Yingfen and Ma Chaojun was subsequently held 
at Nanjing on 21 March. It was decided, upon Ma’s recommendation, that Chen Jitang 
be appointed Special Deputy for the Reorganization and Discharge of Troops in 
Guangdong, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army in 
replacement of Li Jishen.5 Chen thereby assumed command of all regular forces in 
Guangdong in April 1929. He demonstrated his brilliance as a military commander by 
routing Guangxi troops which invaded Guangdong in May, and expelling another 
attack by the joint forces of the New Guangxi Clique and Zhang Fakui in December 
(Lin Huaping, 1996: 144-51). 
 Chen Jitang’s grip on Guangdong was not yet firm; for, in accordance with the 
prevailing principle of “separating military and civil rule” (junmin fenzhi), he had to 
share power with Chen Mingshu, Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Government. 
Moreover, Chen Jitang was ordered by Jiang Jieshi to clear up the situation in 
Guangxi and to wipe out Zhang Fakui’s forces in Hunan. Consequently, Chen was 
absent from Guangdong for seven months in 1930, commanding the newly 
established field headquarters at Wuzhou in Guangxi and directing campaigns on the 
Hunan front (Guangdongsheng dang’anguan, 1995-96: 12/380-413, 13/1-32). He thus 
had little time attending to affairs in Guangdong. These were largely taken care of by 
Chen Mingshu who found military expenses incurred by Chen Jitang’s campaigns 
outside Guangdong extremely burdensome for the Guangdong Provincial 
Government. 
 Chen Mingshu had relinquished military power after becoming Chairman of the 
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Guangdong Provincial Government, and the 60th and 61st Divisions of the Eighth 
Route Army previously under his command were regrouped into the 19th Route Army 
and sent out of Guangdong on combat missions. To strengthen his position, Chen 
Mingshu organized four “security corps” (baoantuan) which were assigned to pacify 
the localities. They were placed under the Guangdong Provincial Government, and 
this aroused the suspicions of Chen Jitang (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 83; Zhu Zongzhen, 1997: 
65). 
 A dramatic turn of event drew Chen Jitang into the vortex of GMD factional 
struggles, and paved the way for his eventual domination of Guangdong. In late 
February 1931, Hu Hanmin, President of the Legislative Yuan, objected to Jiang 
Jieshi’s proposal for a provisional tutelage constitution and was detained by Jiang.6 An 
anti-Jiang movement was soon under way, and Chen Jitang was finally won over to 
the anti-Jiang cause through the persuasion his long-time patron, Gu Yingfen. Two 
circular telegrams were dispatched from Guangzhou in late April and early May, 
impeaching Jiang for his illegal arrest of Hu. Despite severe warnings from Jiang, 
Chen inaugurated a separatist National Government in Guangzhou on 28 May.7  
 Sad to say, the Guangzhou National Government comprised a medley of rival 
politicians and militarists who would have warred against one another had it not been 
for their ambitions to do away with Jiang Jieshi. The situation in Guangzhou in the 
second half of 1931 actually turned out to be a farce. Chen Jitang played a crucial role 
in this separatist movement by providing military support. He faced a delicate 
situation, and needed to calculate every move to make sure that his own power base 
would not fall prey to GMD factional politics. There is little doubt, however, that 
Chen had benefited tremendously from getting involved. In the first place, he got rid 
of Chen Mingshu who, upon realizing the precariousness of the situation, fled to Hong 
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Kong on 28 April.8 Henceforth, Chen Jitang could rest assured that the chairman of 
the Guangdong Provincial Government would be a candidate of his choice. Secondly, 
he disarmed and disbanded the four “security corps” loyal to Chen Mingshu after the 
latter’s departure from Guangzhou (Guangzhou minguo ribao, 26 May 1931). As a 
result, rival military units were finally eliminated. Thirdly, Chen used the 
establishment of the Guangzhou National Government as an excuse to reorganize and 
expand the Eighth Route Army into the First Group Army, and made himself 
commander-in-chief (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 87-88). This greatly enhanced his position and 
power. And finally, since Li Zongren joined the separatist movement, hostilities with 
Guangxi ceased and a long-term threat to Guangdong’s security was removed. 
Apparently, Chen Jitang had emerged as a victor in the separatist movement. 
 Tension between Guangzhou and Nanjing eased after the Mukden Incident (18 
September) and the subsequent release of Hu Hanmin (13 October). Negotiations 
ensued, which fully exposed the conflicts among the separatists and made a mockery 
of unity against Jiang Jieshi. On 1 January 1932, Chen Jitang dissolved the 
Guangzhou National Government, which signified the termination of confrontation 
with Nanjing. However, two new organs with self-assigned authority over Guangdong 
and Guangxi were simultaneously inaugurated: the Southwest Executive Branch of 
the Central Executive Committee of the GMD and the Southwest Political Council of 
the National Government (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 88-90). Though professing allegiance to 
Nanjing, Chen had actually brought about the semi-independence of the southwest. 
 By March 1932, Chen Jitang, with the help of his crony Lin Yizhong, had 
grasped control of all provincial, municipal and county party organs in Guangdong  
(Liu Tingsheng, 1987: 135-38). As regards the provincial government, Chen’s 
principal concern was to hold the purse strings. An opportunity arrived when Feng 
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Zhuwan, who headed Guangdong’s Department of Finance and was close to Jiang 
Jieshi, resigned on 6 May. Chen immediately replaced Feng by his henchman, Qu 
Fangpu, to make sure that Guangdong’s revenue would henceforth be at his disposal 
(Guangdongsheng dang’anguan, 1995-96: 13/151).  
 A week before Feng Zhuwan tendered his resignation, Chen Jitang took active 
steps to remove a major obstacle to his quest for supremacy in Guangdong, namely, 
the independence of the Guangdong navy and air force from First Group Army 
command. Their independence occurred right after the establishment of the 
Guangzhou National Government in late May 1931. When Chen Jitang reorganized 
the Eighth Route Army into the First Group Army and made himself 
commander-in-chief, Sun Ke simultaneously created separate naval and air force 
general headquarters under the Guangzhou National Government, and installed his 
own men, Chen Ce and Zhang Huichang, as commanders-in-chief respectively. The 
dissolution of the Guangzhou National Government in early 1932 provided Chen 
Jitang with an excuse to take over control of the navy and air force. Stressing the need 
to reduce military expenditure and achieve unified command, Chen dissolved the air 
force general headquarters on 30 April. He further dissolved the naval general 
headquarters on 3 May. Chen Ce retaliated and set up a rival naval headquarters at 
Haikou on Hainan Island. His resistance was nevertheless crushed when Chen Jitang’s 
air force bombed Haikou and sank the mutinous naval vessel Feiying on 5 July (Luo 
Yiqun, 1987: 88, 92-94; Ding Jixu, 1987: 172-77; Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 
150-51). Chen Jitang now reigned supreme in Guangdong. He also gained the support 
of the New Guangxi Clique. Posing himself as a follower of the Sun Yat-senist 
tradition, Chen launched, on 1 January 1933, a comprehensive program of 
reconstruction called the “Three-Year Administrative Plan” (Sannian shizheng jihua) 
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which aimed at creating “a model, new Guangdong” (mofan zhi xinGuangdong).9 By 
then, Chen had become “King of the Southern Skies.” 
 
CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AS “KING OF THE SOUTHERN SKIES” 
 Although Chen Jitang had no ambitions to seek territories outside Guangdong, he 
saw army building as a task of paramount importance; for he needed a strong army to 
ward off external threats and to wipe out bandits and communists within his domain. 
In reorganizing the Eighth Route Army into the First Group Army in June 1931, Chen 
expanded the 59th, 62nd and 63rd Divisions into the First, Second and Third Armies 
respectively. He also expanded the 1st and 2nd Independent Brigades into the 1st and 
2nd Independent Divisions respectively, and formed a new Training Division, 5 new 
independent brigades and 8 new independent regiments (see Table 1). This tripled the 
size of the Guangdong army, which rose from 50,000 to 150,000 men. Apart from 
minor reorganization at the division and brigade levels after 1932, the military 
establishment of Guangdong remained more or less the same until the fall of Chen in 
July 1936 (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 145, 153-54). 
 Efforts were also made to manufacture and purchase modern weaponry. The 
existing Shijing Arsenal, which produced cartridges, rifles, machine guns and 
smokeless powder, was expanded during 1933-35 to include a new grenade plant, a 
new mortar plant and a new power plant. It employed 2,000 workers and technicians, 
operated 12 hours a day, and had a capacity of producing 2,100,000 cartridges, 1,000  
rifles, 6-18 German-style heavy machine guns, 6-18 mortars, 1,200 shells and 20,000 
grenades a month. Its total monthly outlay was in the region of 200,000 yuan 
(Guangdong dollars) (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 147-48). Chen Jitang  
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TABLE 1: Organization of the First Group Army, July 1932 
 
 
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 
 
Commander-in-Chief: Chen Jitang 
Chief-of-Staff: Mou Peinan ; Chief Adjutant: He Luo; Secretary-General: Zhang Zhaoqin; Chief Councillor: Li Hanhun; Director of General Office: Zhang Guoyuan; 
Director of Political Department: Qu Fangpu 
 
ARMY 
 
The First Army (previously 59th Division )  The Second Army (previously 62nd Division)  The Third Army (previously 63rd Division) 
Commander: Yu Hanmou  Commander: Xiang Hanping  Commander: Li Yangjing 
Chief-of-Staff: Yang Gang  Chief-of-Staff: Ye Minyu  Chief-of-Staff: Zhou Zhi 
Director of Political Department: Li Xunhuan  Director of Political Department: Li Heling  Director of Political Department: Di Junqian 
1st Division Commander: Li Zhenqiu  4th Division Commander: Zhang Meixin  7th Division Commander: Huang Tingzhen 
2nd Division Commander: Ye Zhao  5th Division Commander: Zhang Da  8th Division Commander: Huang Zhiwe 
 
The 1st Independent Division (previously 1st Independent Brigade) Division Commander: Huang Renhuan 
The 2nd Independent Division (previously 2nd Independent Brigade) Division Commander: Zhang Ruigui 
The Training Division (new) Division Commander: Mou Peinan  
The Independent Guards Brigade (new) Brigade Commander: Chen Hanguang 
The Independent 1st Brigade (new) Brigade Commander: Fan Dexing 
The Independent 2nd Brigade (new) Brigade Commander: Chen Zhang 
The Independent 3rd Brigade (new) Brigade Commander: Yan Yingyu 
The Independent 4th Brigade (new) Brigade Commander: Li Jiezhi 
The Independent 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Regiments (new) 
 
NAVY 
Commander: Zhang Zhiying 
AIR FORCE 
Commander: Huang Guangrui 
Source: Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 145-6, 151. 
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nevertheless found the Shijing Arsenal deficient in producing cannon. In July 1933, 
Chen and Li Zongren deputized their respective chiefs-of-staff, Mou Peinan and  
Zhang Renmin, to sign a contract with Hänschenklein Böcklin, a German arms dealer, 
to undertake the construction of a new arsenal at Pajiang for the sum of 
HK$5,490,800. In September, Chen again deputized Mou to sign another contract 
with Böcklin to undertake the building of a gas mask plant for the sum of 
HK$295,000. It was reckoned that Chen had spent a total of 11,000,000 dayuan 
(national dollars) on these two projects. That sum was practically wasted. Although 
the Pajiang Arsenal trial-produced a 10.5 cm. fieldpiece and two 7.5 cm. mortars in 
1935, it did not go into operation, whereas the gas mask plant did not even start 
trial-producing when Chen fell from power (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 148-49; 
Deng Yancun, 1987: 161-67; Guangdongsheng guofang keji gongye bangongshi, 1989: 
185-96). To upgrade the level of mechanization of his ground force, Chen purchased 
12 tanks and 15 armored cars from Britain in 1935. These vehicles formed a special 
crack unit within his army (Liu Chi, 1984: 157). 
 The might of air power first dawned upon Chen Jitang when the Guangdong air 
force helped to defeat Zhang Fakui’s invading troops in late 1929 (Li Debiao, 1985: 
124-25). Chen thereby expanded the aircraft repair plant at Dongshan in Guangzhou 
with a view to manufacturing light bombers. He simultaneously purchased 6 pursuit 
planes and 4 light bombers of British manufacture, as well as 6 fighter planes and 7 
light bombers of American manufacture. The success of the air force in crushing Chen 
Ce’s mutiny in mid-1932 further convinced Chen Jitang that his power would 
tremendously increase by upgrading his air units. He thus purchased more aircraft 
since 1933: 29 pursuit planes, 10 reconnaissance planes, 6 monoplanes and 1 transport 
plane from the United States; and 6 medium bombers and 3 advanced trainer aircraft 
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from Germany. Besides, he spent 300,000 yuan in building a new aircraft plant at 
Shaoguan, which was completed in 1935. By 1936, Chen commanded 6 squadrons of 
aircraft comprising 130 planes of different types. However, their defection en masse 
in July of the same year dealt him a fatal blow (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 152-53; 
Ding Jixu, 1987: 177-81). 
 As regards the navy, Chen Jitang’s prime concern was to rid it of Chen Ce’s 
influence. Following his suppression of Chen Ce’s mutiny, Chen Jitang placed the 
Huangpu Naval Academy under close surveillance, and dismissed over 50 cadets who 
were suspected of having close ties with Chen Ce. An interesting point to note is that 
during 1933-36, the captains of the more important naval vessels of Guangdong were 
army officers rather than graduates of the naval academy. This was Chen Jitang’s 
method of controlling the navy. With respect to strengthening naval power, Chen 
concentrated on expanding his fleet of light craft. In 1934, he spent HK$2,000,000 for 
the purchase of 4 torpedo coastal motor boats, 2 from Britain and 2 from Italy. They 
formed a special unit, and the captains of these 4 boats were all graduates of the 
Guangdong Military Political Academy at Yantang. In the spring of 1935, Chen spent 
another HK$30,000 in buying a minesweeper from France. This boat and a new 
gunboat built by the Guangnan Shipyard in Guangzhou were placed under the 
command of his brother, Chen Weizhou, who was the Salt Transport Commissioner of 
Guangdong and Guangxi. And shortly before his fall, Chen Jitang bought an old 
British passenger-cargo vessel for HK$10,000. It was re-equipped and turned into a 
transport ship (Xu Yaozhen, 1987: 188-91).10 
 So far, we have seen how Chen Jitang became the lord of Guangdong’s military 
establishment. In order to understand Chen’s paramount position in Guangdong since 
the summer of 1932, we also need to take into account his pervasive influence in the 
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non-military sector of Guangdong’s power structure. Presumably, Chen’s lavish 
military spending would have met strong opposition from the civilian sector had he 
not succeeded in bringing the provincial government under his sway. Its top organ, the 
Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, met twice a week to deliberate 
and resolve matters of importance. Interestingly, the minutes of the 509 meetings of 
the Sixth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government (June 1931－July 
1936) reveal no trace of Chen’s influence. As a matter of fact, he attended only one of 
those meetings as a non-voting observer.11 This seems odd, but is not difficult to 
explain; for Chen, as Commander-in-Chief of the First Group Army, was excluded 
from membership of that Committee by virtue of the principle of “separating military 
and civil rule.”  
 How then did Chen Jitang control the provincial government? His strategy, 
in short, was to place his henchmen in leading government posts. They included: Qu 
Fangpu (Director of the Department of Finance), Lin Yizhong (Director of the 
Department of Civil Administration), Huang Linshu (Director of the Department of 
Education), Chen Weizhou (Salt Transport Commissioner of Guangdong and 
Guangxi), He Luo (Chief of the Public Security Bureau of Guangzhou Municipality) 
and Chen Dacai (Chief of the District Courts of Justice of Guangzhou Municipality). 
Other top posts were staffed by close relatives or associates of the so-called “seniors 
faction” (yuanlao pai) that backed him up. For instance, the Mayor of Guangzhou, 
Liu Jiwen, was the son-in-law of Chen’s patron, Gu Yingfen. In order to please Hu 
Hanmin, head of the “seniors faction” and nominal leader of the semi-independent 
southwest, Chen appointed Hu’s protégé, Lin Yungai, as Chairman of the Guangdong 
Provincial Government. He also appointed Lin’s close friend, He Qili, as Director of 
the Department of Reconstruction while installing his own men as bureau chiefs 
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inside that department. In this way, Chen Jitang made sure that his views prevailed (Li 
Jiezhi, 1987: 14; Qiu Ping 1987: 123-28). 
 Moreover, Chen exerted control over county administration through the help of 
Lin Yizhong who, in September 1933, started and supervised an “advanced political 
study course” (zhengzhi shenzaoban) in the Guangdong Military Political Academy to 
train basic-level functionaries. By early 1936, 49 graduates of this course had been 
appointed county magistrates after passing interviews conducted by a “county 
magistrate examination committee” set up by Lin in April 1933. Many more graduates 
had taken up appointments as bureau chiefs, section heads and secretaries in county 
governments.12  
 Control of the basic level was further facilitated by the launching of “local 
self-government” (difang zizhi). In February 1932, the Department of Civil 
Administration established an institute to train local self-government personnel, and a 
total of 3,419 persons had graduated from this institute by March 1936 
(Guangdongsheng minzhengting, 1936: 118-19, 122).13 These people, together with 
graduates of the “advanced political study course,” constituted the backbone of Chen 
Jitang’s local government functionaries. Even the “cooperative movement” (hezuo 
yundong), as John Fitzgerald points out, “was only incidentally a movement for 
alleviating rural poverty in the province,” for it was actually “a tactical arm of a grand 
bureaucratic strategy for pacifying the province, extending provincial government 
authority, and routinizing local administration” (Fitzgerald, 1997: 451). Moreover, in 
order to eradicate the armed basis of gentry power in the localities, Chen wrested 
control of the “local security guard teams” (difang jingweidui) from the hands of the 
gentry. In 1934, he set up a special office within the General Headquarters of the First 
Group Army to take charge of the reorganization of all “local security guard teams.” 
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He also started a training course in the Guangdong Military Political Academy with a 
view to nurturing loyal “security guards” (Guangdongsheng minzhengting, 1936: 
37).14 Clearly, Chen Jitang strove to achieve monopoly of power in all sectors of state 
and society, and at all levels; for this would eliminate threats to his rule and allow him 
to tap resources as he wished.  
 Admittedly, Chen recognized the importance of gaining mass support. He 
nevertheless feared letting the masses go their own way, as he once remarked: “The 
power of the masses is great. Yet, the masses are easily deceived, and they easily 
abuse power….Our party must therefore open-heartedly guide them and arouse 
them…to stand by and fight with us” (Chen Jitang, 1928: 19). Chen was probably 
driven by a real concern for the well being of the toiling masses, and saw himself 
playing the role of a benevolent patriarch. When some reporters solicited his views on 
good governance, he promptly replied: “First, make sure that the folks have food to 
eat; second, make sure that they have enough to eat; and third, make sure that they eat 
well” (Chen Jitang xiansheng, 1974: 80).  
 In launching the “Three-Year Administrative Plan,” Chen obviously wanted to 
impress upon the people of Guangdong that his government had much to offer. He 
promised, among other things, to wipe out banditry, abolish exorbitant taxes and 
miscellaneous levies, reduce rent, provide relief to the poor, popularize education, 
promote agriculture and industry, and improve transport and communication. It is not 
the purpose of this article to assess the effectiveness of the “Three-Year 
Administrative Plan.” The following discussion will nevertheless show that Chen had 
difficulties fulfilling his promises because he was primarily concerned with tapping 
resources to finance his war machine. 
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FUNDING A WARLORD REGIME: METHODS AND REPURCUSSIONS 
 
MILITARY EXPENSES IN GUANGDONG’S BUDGET 
 Finances constitute the mainstay of any government. Tables 2 and 3 present a 
profile of the fiscal situation in Guangdong from the beginning of the Republic to the 
mid-1930s. The data reveal an excess of expenditure over income for all fiscal years 
(except 1912-13), and this was due to the fact that Guangdong incurred huge military 
expenses in this period.  
 With reference to the period 1912-29, Table 2 shows that of the 18 fiscal years 
recorded, there were 13 in which tax receipts were insufficient to cover military 
expenses. On the average, military expenses accounted for 93% of all taxes received 
by the provincial government during those years. Taking both tax and non-tax receipts 
into calculation, the proportion of military expenses to total revenue ranged from 50% 
in some years to 100% in some other years, averaging 68% for the period. In absolute 
terms, military expenses soared to an all-time high of 83,266,000 yuan in 1926-27. 
The reason is that Guangdong bore the costs of the Northern Expedition that started 
out from this province. As observed by the American journalist Hallett Abend, 
“Canton, by the end of June [1926], was like a squeezed lemon. All the juice and 
flavor was gone. It was a city of apathy” (Abend, 1943: 33).15 Military expenses 
remained high in the region of 49-61 million yuan per annum for the remaining years 
of the 1920s.  
 An interesting point to note is the small proportion of the land tax to total 
revenue, averaging only 10% during 1912-29 and as little as 5% during 1925-29. This 
contrasted with provinces such as Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, where the 
land tax usually made up 50% or more of their annual provincial revenues 
(Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/67). The peculiar situation in Guangdong 
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TABLE 2: Revenue and Expenditure of the Guangdong Provincial Government, 1912-30 
 
 Revenue (Yuan)  Expenditure (Yuan) Balance of 
Revenue and 
 
Fiscal Yr. 
Land 
Tax 
Gambling 
Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
All Tax 
Receipts 
Non-Tax 
Receipts 
Total 
Revenue 
 Military 
Expenses 
Other 
Expenses 
Total 
Expenditure 
Expenditure 
(Yuan) 
1912-13 3,837,000  15,361,000 19,198,000 18,941,000 38,139,000  19,749,000 12,083,000 31,832,000  + 6,307,000 
1913-14 3,963,000  11,139,000 15,102,000 4,577,000 19,679,000  19,461,000 8,303,000 27,764,000  − 8,085,000 
1914-15 2,662,000 1,850,000 10,070,000 14,582,000 5,846,000 20,428,000  12,504,000 10,471,000 22,975,000  − 2,547,000 
1915-16 2,912,000 2,064,000 9,230,000 14,206,000 5,732,000 19,938,000  11,377,000 12,884,000 24,261,000  − 4,323,000 
1916-17 2,034,000 1,911,000 8,608,000 12,553,000 12,504,000 25,057,000  14,327,000 23,920,000 38,247,000  − 13,190,000 
1917-18 1,971,000 1,506,000 9,535,000 13,012,000 15,004,000 28,016,000  15,187,000 24,986,000 40,173,000  − 12,157,000 
1918-19 2,164,000 2,907,000 9,958,000 15,029,000 13,836,000 28,865,000  15,703,000 24,410,000 40,113,000  − 11,248,000 
1919-20 4,655,000 2,335,000 11,077,000 18,067,000 14,111,000 32,178,000  21,319,000 25,737,000 47,056,000  − 14,878,000 
1920-21 2,167,000 737,000 10,248,000 13,152,000 9,230,000 22,382,000  16,319,000 20,375,000 36,694,000  − 14,312,000 
1921-22 4,061,000 6,000 17,254,000 21,321,000 9,145,000 30,466,000  23,593,000 17,483,000 41,076,000  − 10,610,000 
1922-23 2,475,000  13,981,000 16,456,000 7,652,000 24,108,000  22,759,000 10,945,000 33,704,000  − 9,596,000 
1923-24 2,017,000 34,000 5,122,000 7,173,000 6,643,000 13,818,000  8,815,000 7,909,000 16,724,000  − 2,906,000 
1924-25 1,770,000 5,000 4,790,000 6,565,000 3,181,000 9,746,000  6,208,000 5,988,000 12,196,000  − 2,450,000 
1925-26 2,144,000 7,527,000 21,000,000 30,671,000 19,703,000 50,374,000  35,943,000 34,341,000 70,284,000  − 19,910,000 
1926-27 5,507,000 16,886,000 59,470,000 81,863,000 2,959,000 84,822,000  83,266,000 42,164,000 125,430,000  − 40,608,000 
1927-28 2,455,000 12,861,000 51,604,000 66,920,000 12,219,000 79,139,000  61,162,000 50,084,000 111,246,000  − 32,107,000 
1928-29 3,200,936 14,575,500 57,244,365 75,020,801 9,103,344 84,124,145  52,793,066 71,127,541 123,920,607  − 39,796,462 
1929-30 5,674,337 14,006,055 73,108,919 92,789,311 7,707,000 100,496,311  49,373,327 87,895,461 137,168,788  − 36,672,477 
 
Source: Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/106-12, 3/ 282-466. 
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TABLE 3: Revenue and Expenditure of the Guangdong Provincial Government, 1930-35                
 
Revenue (Yuan) 
      
 National           Treasury  Provincial            Treasury   
               
Fiscal 
Yr. 
Opium 
Sup-pressio
n Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
All Tax 
Receipts 
Non-Tax 
Receipts 
Total 
Revenue 
 Gambling 
Tax 
Land 
Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
All Tax 
Receipts 
Non-Tax 
Receipts 
Total 
Revenue 
 Grand 
Total 
1930-31 5,994,699 23,940,660 29,935,359 1,672,362 31,607,721  14,528,603 4,150,277 10,179,937 28,858,817 20,537,010 49,395,827  81,003,548 
1931-32 8,361,699 24,099,463 32,461,162 3,855,605 36,316,767  13,583,506 4,483,270 9,864,077 27,930,853 15,350,434 43,281,287  79,598,054 
1932-33 8,699,971 23,824,449 32,524,420 3,959,155 36,483,575  17,370,969 4,304,725 10,055,499 31,731,193 17,226,681 48,957,874  85,441,449 
1933-34 12,165,181 27,245,311 39,410,491 4,175,441 43,585,933  15,186,696 28,487,312 43,674,008 12,988,911 56,662,919  100,248,852 
1934-35 11,271,292 27,636,778 38,908,070 5,004,956 43,913,026  13,282,991 38,898,720 52,181,711 22,045,527 74,227,238  118,140,264 
 
 
 
 Expenditure (Yuan)    Balance of Revenue & Expenditure 
       (Yuan) 
          
 National  Treasury  Provincial  Treasury       
            
Fiscal 
Yr. 
Military 
Expenses 
Total 
Expenditure 
 Regular 
Expenses 
Total 
Expenditure 
 Grand 
Total 
 National 
Treasury 
Provincial 
Treasury 
National & Pro- 
vincial Treasury 
1930-31 40,256,960 56,648,422  16,988,095 65,666,101  122,314,534  − 25,040,701 − 16,270,274 − 41,310,986 
1931-32 50,263,877 65,470,983  13,358,145 57,260,340  122,731,323  − 29,154,216 − 13,979,053 − 43,133,269 
1932-33 45,412,780 55,947,639  15,401,788 63,969,102  119,916,741  − 19,464,064 − 14,993,228 − 34,475,292 
1933-34 55,288,486 62,660,756  26,269,370 52,918,078  115,578,834  − 19,074,823 +  3,744,841 − 15,329,982 
1934-35 59,956,742 70,490,936  30,143,869 72,432,654  143,423,590  − 26,577,910 +  1,794,584 − 25,283,334 
 
Source: Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/112-15, 3/466-528 (For the fiscal years 1930-31, 1931-32 and 1932-33); Xiong Li, 1935: 7-17; Xiong Li, 1936: 2/533-35 
(For the fiscal years 1933-34 and 1934-35). 
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was due to the proliferation of a large number of “miscellaneous taxes and levies” 
(shuijuan) which the provincial government found attractive, as they were easier to 
collect and yielded quicker returns than the land tax. Of particular importance was the 
gambling tax, euphemistically called the “defense fund” (chouxiang). Except for two 
brief periods when Chen Jiongming ruled Guangdong and decided to wipe out 
gambling (Huang Linsheng, 1936: 31-33; Wei Gong, 1964: 106, 109-10), the 
gambling tax provided a lucrative source of income for financing military campaigns 
across the province. Indeed, the gambling tax had become the most important source 
of tax income in Guangdong ever since the GMD prepared for the Northern 
Expedition, amounting to 3-5 times the land tax collected and accounting for 14-20% 
of the total provincial revenue during 1925-29.  
 The Guangdong government had also accumulated huge debts over the years in 
order to make up deficits. They included mainly government debts to the central bank, 
public bonds and treasury notes. By early 1928, the provincial treasury had inherited 
debts amounting to 200,000,000 yuan, half of which were contracted during 1924-27 
(Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/57-58).  
 What was the fiscal situation like after the ascendancy of Chen Jitang? Table 3 
shows that the general state of finance in Guangdong during 1930-35 was more or less 
the same as in the preceding period. The provincial government continued to register 
budget deficits. The land tax still constituted 5% of the total revenue, whereas the 
gambling tax amounted to three times the land tax collected. Military expenses, 
ranging from 40-60 million yuan per annum, remained the most important item of 
expenditure. On the average, they accounted for 71% of all tax receipts and 54% of 
the total revenue. Although Guangdong was free from war in this period, Chen 
Jitang’s mammoth military program, as well as his campaigns against bandits and 
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Communists, had kept military spending at a high level throughout his rule. 
 The inauguration of tax sharing between the central and provincial governments 
in the Nanjing era complicated fiscal administration and constituted a major source of 
disputes between Guangdong and Nanjing. Although tax-sharing arrangements were 
finalized by Song Ziwen in July 1928, it was not until the fiscal year 1930-31 that 
Guangdong’s budget drew a distinction between national revenue and expenditure on 
the one hand, and provincial revenue and expenditure on the other (Guangdongsheng 
caizhengting, 1934: 1/66-67, 3/466-87).16  
 Table 4 presents a profile of the incomes and expenditures of Guangdong’s 
national treasury during 1930-35. With respect to taxes that were designated as 
national, two were particularly important after Chen Jitang achieved supremacy in 
Guangdong. The first was the so-called “consolidated tax” (tongshui) which included 
excise duties on rolled tobacco, flour, cotton yarn, matches and cement. It constituted 
33% of all taxes and 30% of all revenues (including both tax and non-tax receipts) 
received by the national treasury during 1931-35. The second was the opium tax 
which was collected under the euphemism of the “opium-suppression tax” 
(jinyanshui). It constituted 28% of all taxes and 25% of all revenues received by the 
national treasury in the same period. Other important national taxes included the salt 
tax, tobacco and wine tax, stamp tax and customs duty. As regards expenditures that 
were designated as national, one item surpassed all others in importance. This was 
military expense, which constituted 80% of the total expenditures of the national 
treasury during 1930-35. It is noteworthy that in any single fiscal year of this period, 
military spending alone outstripped the total revenue of the national treasury. This 
meant no money was ever left in the national treasury and consequently, no revenue 
was ever submitted to Nanjing. 
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TABLE 4: Revenue and Expenditure of the National Treasury of the Guangdong Provincial Government, 1930-35 
 
                                     Fiscal                    Year 
Revenue and Expenditure 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 
Revenue: (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) 
(1) Taxes:      
 a) Salt  8,325,137  6,929,266  7,054,409  5,160,457  5,004,271 
 b) Tobacco & wine  4,103,348  5,528,711  4,635,919  6,583,080  5,029,683 
 c) Stamp  1,692,228  2,098,914  1,731,235  2,117,686  1,998,822 
 d) Customs  632,690  74,498  37,258  49,369  63,098 
 e) Consolidated  1,275,677  9,057,292  10,176,848  13,055,971  15,257,598 
 f) Opium suppression  5,994,699  8,361,699  8,699,971  12,165,181  11,271,292 
 g) Others  7,911,580  410,782  188,780  278,747  283,306 
  Sub-total  29,935,359  32,461,162  32,524,420  39,410,491  38,908,070 
(2) Non-tax receipts  1,672,362  3,855,605  3,959,155  4,175,441  5,004,956 
Total revenue  31,607,721  36,316,767  36,483,575  43,585,933  43,913,026 
Expenditure:      
(1) Party expenses  49,880  25,440  15,856  nil  30,472 
(2) Diplomatic expenses  5,320  8,000  4,088  7,862  7,862 
(3) Administrative expenses of home affairs  236,993  458,980  352,536  375,021  406,999 
(4) Expenses of financial administration  1,378,978  1,015,482  572,797  1,630,408  2,725,880 
(5) Expenses for education  1,277,800  1,611,809  1,993,597  2,369,717  3,590,275 
(6) Military expenses  40,256,960  50,263,877  45,412,781  55,288,486  59,956,742 
(7) Others  13,442,491  12,087,395  7,595,984  2,989,262  3,772,706 
Total expenditure  56,648,422 65,470,983  55,947,639  62,660,756  70,490,936 
Balance of revenue and expenditure －25,040,701  －29,154,216  －19,464,064  －19,074,823  －26,577,910 
 
Source: Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/112-15, 3/466-71, 477-81, 487-92, 497-502, 508-12, 518-23 (For the fiscal years 1930-31, 1931-32 and 1932-33); Xiong Li, 
1935: 7-11; Xiong Li, 1936: 2/533-35 (For the fiscal years 1933-34 and 1934-35). 
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 In order to defray military expenses, an arrangement was made to the effect that 
the provincial treasury would make up the deficits of the national treasury 
(Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/66). This modus operandi generated 
conflicts between Chen Jitang and Chen Mingshu when the latter was Chairman of 
the Guangdong Provincial Government.  
 In his memoirs, Chen Mingshu recalls that Chen Jitang “had never interfered 
with government affairs under my jurisdiction;” yet, he ridicules Chen Jitang as one 
who “pretends to be a pig and swallows up a tiger” (banzhu chi laohu) (Zhu Zongzhen, 
1997: 67, 121). The two men were certainly at loggerheads. Speaking on National 
Day of 1930, Chen Mingshu expressed regrets that little accomplishment had been 
made because huge sums had been taken away from the provincial treasury to pay for 
military expenses (Zhu Zongzhen and Wang Chaoguang, 1996: 72). Jiang Jieshi 
summed up the conflicts between the two Chens after Chen Mingshu silently left 
Guangzhou in late April of 1931: 
 The revenues that Guangdong ought to remit to the central government 
have all been turned over to Chen Jitang to defray his military spending. 
Still not satisfied, he draws money from the provincial treasury. His army 
comprises only five divisions and, according to central regulations 
governing military expenditure, he requires less than 1,500,000 yuan a 
month to pay his troops. However, Chen Jitang demands 4,300,000 yuan a 
month, which is three times more than what is needed to maintain a central 
army of the same size. He also gets 800,000 yuan a month from those areas 
in Guangxi that he occupies, without reporting this to the central authorities 
and waiting for central allocation. It all adds up to over 5,000,000 yuan a 
month…. Consequently, Chen Mingshu, Chairman of the Guangdong 
Provincial Government, finds it impossible to get anything done. Gambling 
cannot be banned and bandits cannot be wiped out because Chen Jitang’s 
army has seized all incomes. Nothing can get moving. Chairman Chen has 
long wished to resign…[for] such a state of affairs has been going on for a 
long time…. Chen Jitang, on the other hand, has also been long dissatisfied 
with Chairman Chen Mingshu, as he cannot levy taxes according to his own 
wish. In particular, after the central government abolishes the collection of 
likin, Chen Jitang’s troops can no longer go around extorting likin as they 
had done before. This has aroused their dissatisfaction…. All these matters 
can be confirmed by official telegrams. They are based on evidence that can 
be verified. [Guangdongsheng dang’anguan, 1985: 95]  
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 With the departure of Chen Mingshu and especially after the appointment of Qu 
Fangpu to head the Treasury, Chen Jitang had little trouble controlling the purse 
strings of Guangdong. He could now levy taxes as he wished, and spend revenues in 
ways he saw fit. Undoubtedly, Chen Jitang assigned top priority to funding 
Guangdong’s military establishment. He also had the final say on all matters 
pertaining to military spending. Any requests for additional military expenses had to 
have Chen’s approval in the form of written instructions to the Department of Finance 
before payments were made. It was said that Chen signed his instructions in a variety 
of ways, or used special marks in lieu of signatures, to denote how much to pay and 
when to pay. It was also said that only Qu Fangpu knew what those different 
signatures or marks implied (Chen Boren, 1987: 295).  
 Until Chen’s fall, Guangdong was beyond Nanjing’s reach in matters of finance. 
No revenue was ever submitted to Nanjing because military expenses, which came 
under the category of national expenditure, always exceeded the total annual revenue 
of the national treasury. This not only angered Jiang Jieshi, but also alienated those 
people who cherished de facto national reunification (“Jinhou zhi Yue ju,” 1936:10). 
Significantly, Chen Jitang’s rule of Guangdong shows that fiscal autonomy, rather 
than men at arms, provided the very foundation of military separatism. Scholarly 
works on “residual warlordism” seldom explore the fiscal relationship between 
particular warlord regimes and the central government. We only know from Robert 
Kapp’s study of Sichuan that, apart from a very small portion of the salt tax revenue, 
none of the other so-called “national taxes” were ever forwarded to Nanjing (Kapp, 
1973: 71). The extent to which this phenomenon prevailed in China during the 
Nanjing era will come to light when more case studies are conducted. 
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TAPPING THE SOURCE OF FINANCE (KAIYUAN) 
 To obtain the sinews of war and to keep his regime afloat, Chen Jitang racked his 
brain to find the quickest and most economical means of increasing incomes. 
Although he promised to reduce tax burdens, he failed to live up to his promise 
because of the imperative and urgent need to tap every possible source of finance. 
Following is a discussion of Chen’s methods of increasing incomes and their 
repercussions. 
 I. Increasing Tax Revenue. Table 3 shows that total tax revenue (that is, receipts 
from both national and provincial taxes) had increased from 58,794,176 yuan in 
1930-31 to 91,089,781 yuan in 1934-35. As mentioned, the Guangdong government’s 
tax revenue depended largely on “miscellaneous taxes and levies.” They were usually 
collected by tax-farmers, and several layers of underwriting companies often existed. 
Though most of these taxes originated as ad hoc levies, they were as a rule 
regularized and so, they accumulated over the long run. In Zhongshan county, for 
instance, a total of 60 “miscellaneous taxes and levies” existed by the 1930s, 
including the obnoxious excrement tax. Angry taxpayers had reportedly composed a 
couplet, which they sent to one of the tax-farmers. It read: “A tax on excrement was 
never heard of in the past; these days, everything carries a levy except when we fart” 
(Xiao Baoyao, 1989: 26-27). The numbers of “miscellaneous taxes and levies” 
actually varied from county to county and from place to place, for most of them were 
of local origins. Due to widespread chaos in the 1910s and 1920s, a substantial 
portion of the “miscellaneous taxes and levies” collected was embezzled by local 
functionaries and troops alike. Such a situation changed once Chen Jitang installed Qu 
Fangpu as Director of the Department of Finance in May 1932.  
 Qu, with the backing of Chen, immediately declared that the Department of 
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Finance would issue all tax licenses through open bidding starting from October 1932 
(Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/90). This brought about the centralization of 
finance. Coupled with the encouragement of competitions among the tax merchants, 
the provincial government thus managed to procure higher incomes from the host of 
“miscellaneous taxes and levies.” By regulation, the successful bidders were required 
to pay an extra 10% protection fee, euphemistically called the “accumulation fund” 
(gongjijin), to troops stationed in those localities where the taxes were to be collected 
(Qin Qingjun, 1987:297). This was intended to defray local military expenses. It 
nevertheless created serious conflicts between the Second and Third Armies. The truth 
is that the Second Army, when assigned to take over garrison duty from the Third 
Army in central Guangdong, found itself deprived of that region’s protection fees 
which were still collected by Third Army men. Chen Jitang eventually set up a special 
military financial committee to centralize the collection and allocation of the so-called 
“accumulation fund” in order to ease tensions among his commanders (Chen Boren, 
1987: 301-02). 
 Chen Jitang was particularly concerned about the collection of the gambling and 
opium taxes. Public outcry against the demoralization of society caused by gambling 
and opium smoking was strong. Even Chen himself realized that the rampancy of 
these two evils had made a mockery of his slogan of building “a model, new 
Guangdong.” He could not, however, afford to lose these two lucrative taxes which 
local functionaries of the time referred to as “Vitamins A and B” that “sustain the 
vitality of Guangdong” (Wei Gong, 1964: 113).  
 In order to make sure that the collection of these two important taxes was placed 
in trustworthy hands, Chen Jitang issued both the gambling and opium licenses to a 
tactful tax-farmer, Huo Zhiting, who had provided him with 4-5 million yuan during 
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the war with Zhang Fakui in late 1929.17 In the winter of 1933, Chen came under 
strong public pressure to ban gambling. He subsequently ordered the prohibition of 
gambling in Guangzhou. It failed to have any real effect not only because his order 
was not strictly enforced, but also for the reason that the ban did not apply to Henan 
on the southern bank of the Zhujiang where most casinos operated (Wu Xiangheng, 
1987: 329). From July 1932 to June 1935, Chen netted 15,000,000 yuan a year from 
the gambling tax. He also reaped 11,000,000 yuan a year from the opium tax (see 
Table 3). 
 In order to raise the price of opium in Guangdong, Chen Jitang made the 
Guangxi authorities accept an agreement in July 1932. By this agreement, Guangxi 
consented to suppress opium smuggling into Guangdong and to hold regular stocks of 
opium at warehouses in Wuzhou until Chen’s so-called Opium Suppression Bureau 
(Jinyanju) requested shipments. This resulted in a significant loss of revenue for 
Guangxi, and the problem was not solved until a new agreement was reached in late 
1934 (Levich, 1993: 243-44). Yet, the Guangdong-Guangxi opium trade remained 
under the control of the Liangguang Heyi Company ran by Huo Zhiting, who also 
commanded an armed fleet to protect the opium trade and crack down on smuggling 
(Wu Xiangheng, 1987: 328-29). Huo’s supervision of the opium traffic through 
holding the opium license actually typified the system of tax collection that prevailed 
under Chen Jitang’s rule, namely that of “government supervision and merchant 
management” (guandu shangban). 
 Heavy reliance on “miscellaneous taxes and levies” as a source of revenue was 
certainly at odds with the spirit of the “Three-Year Administrative Plan.” To carry out 
its promise of abolishing “harsh and insignificant miscellaneous levies” (kexi zajuan), 
the Guangdong Provincial Government decreed, on 1 January 1933, the abolition of 
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21 harsh levies (Guangdongsheng caizhengting: 1/97). In July 1934, on the eve of the 
convening of the Guangdong Provincial Assembly, Chen Jitang declared that 
miscellaneous levies worth 4,600,000 yuan a year had been annulled during the past 
eighteen months (Chen Jitang, 1934:233). A year later, a Guangzhou newspaper listed 
120 kinds of levies that had been abolished since early 1933, which cost the 
Guangdong Treasury 6,427,500 yuan a year. It also reported on the Guangdong 
Provincial Assembly’s decision to make 1 August a commemoration day, celebrating 
the abolition of harsh miscellaneous levies in Guangdong (Guangzhou minguo ribao, 
22 July 1935). The truth is that no sooner had one type of levy been declared illegal 
than a new one sprang up to take its place. Indeed, the repeated promises to abolish 
harsh miscellaneous levies had been broken with equal regularity throughout Chen’s 
rule. This is shown by the fact that shortly after his fall, the Nanjing Government 
banned 380 kinds of taxes and levies in Guangdong. Another 245 kinds were declared 
null and void in the first three months of 1937 (Kwok Hung-wei, 1989:37). Vigorous 
campaigns against gambling and opium smoking were simultaneously launched 
(Guomin zhengfu junshi weiyuanhui, 1936; Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdongsheng 
dangbu xuanchuanke, 1936). 
 The “Three-Year Administrative Plan” also provided for a reform of the land tax, 
and stipulated that the gambling and opium taxes were to be abrogated once the 
reformed land tax yielded more revenue to the Treasury. Table 3 shows that the land 
tax’s contribution to provincial revenue was small by 1933. It was based on antiquated 
cadastral records, and tax evasion was serious. In October 1933, the Guangdong 
Provincial Government proclaimed that a progressive “provisional land tax” (linshi 
dishui), to be based on current land price, would replace the old land tax. It was 
supposedly a fair tax, as all existing surtaxes on land would be abolished. The tasks of 
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updating land registration and determining land price were in full swing in 1934. By 
early 1936, most counties had adopted the new system. According to official records, 
the land tax quota of the province had increased by 70% as a result of the change. 
Ironically, such an increase was not the result of bringing more acreage under taxation 
through updating land registration. It was rather due to higher tax per unit of land, for 
land price was often arbitrarily assessed and fixed. The landowners thus had to pay 
higher tax, and many old abuses remained (Lin, 1997: 106-13). 
 Another way by which Chen Jitang increased tax revenue was to impose heavy 
duties on goods imported into Guangdong. On 15 May 1933, the Guangdong 
Provincial Government promulgated the levying of “special taxes on foreign 
agricultural products and miscellaneous items” (bolai nongchanpin zaxiang 
zhuanshui). In truth, these so-called “special taxes” applied not only to foreign 
imports, but also to most Chinese goods that were produced outside Guangdong. 
Products that made use of foreign raw materials were taxed; products that competed 
with similar kinds of products manufactured in Guangdong were taxed; and even farm 
produce such as soybean and soya-bean oil produced in Manchuria were taxed (Chen 
Boren, 1987: 298-99).18 Indeed, Chen Jitang had erected a high tariff wall around 
Guangdong in order to protect infant government industries and to reap more revenue. 
This stirred up widespread discontent outside Guangdong and even among the 
Guangdong merchants. People queried what the term “foreign” really meant, and 
criticized the “special taxes” as a disguised form of likin that hampered the 
development of a unified national market (“Yue ju dianding hou zhi juanshui”, 1936: 
3-4). 
 II. Increasing Non-Tax Revenue. Chen Jitang saw the development of 
government industries (shengying gongye) as essential to Guangdong’s economic 
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growth and, more significantly, as a way to increase incomes. The “Three-Year 
Administrative Plan” included an ambitious program for the establishment of 24 
government factories, with a projected capitalization in the region of 100,000,000 
yuan. Top priority was assigned to the establishment of the Wengjiang hydroelectric 
plant (42,500,000 yuan) and an iron and steel mill (26,000,000 yuan) so as to provide 
a solid foundation for industrialization (Guangdongsheng diaochatongjiju, 1934: 4-5; 
Qin Qingjun, 1987: 282-83). This blueprint of industrial development was 
nevertheless not followed during 1933-36. The reason is that the two key industries 
originally plan demanded huge capital outlays and promised no quick returns. As 
Chen Jitang’s principal concern was to tap every possible source of finance, he found 
it necessary to change the strategy of industrial development once the “Three-Year 
Administrative Plan” was under way. He subsequently made the cement and sugar 
industries the cornerstone of his industrial program, based on considerations of 
profitability. 
 Promotion of the cement industry was an obvious choice, for two cement 
factories were operating in Guangzhou at that time: an old one at Henan and a modern 
one at Xicun. This saved construction costs. Moreover, cement was in huge demand in 
Guangdong because various kinds of construction work－municipal construction, 
motor-road and highway construction, and the construction of the southern section of 
the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway－were then in full swing. In July 1933, the Henan 
Cement Factory became a branch of the Xicun Cement Factory where a new set of 
equipment was installed to double its output capacity. To facilitate the sale of cement, 
Chen Jitang not only imposed heavy duties on imported cement, but also required all 
government construction works to use locally produced cement unless special 
permission was granted by the Department of Finance (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 
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1936: 39-41). From June 1932 to the end of 1934, the Xicun Cement Factory yielded 
a net profit of over 5,000,000 yuan. Its importance was highlighted by the Guangdong 
Provincial Statistics Bureau: “The net profit made each year from this factory has 
been distributed for its own extension and for establishing other kinds of factories. 
Therefore it is not only the forerunner but also a founder of other industries owned 
and operated by the Provincial Government” (Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau, 
1935: 5). 
 The policy of promoting the sugar industry was the brainchild of Feng Rui, an 
American-trained professor of agronomy and Chief of the Bureau of Agriculture and 
Forestry of the Guangdong Provincial Department of Reconstruction. Following a 
visit to the Philippines in early 1933, Feng drafted the “Three-Year Plan for the 
Rejuvenation of the Sugar Industry of Guangdong” (Fuxing Guangdong tangye 
sannian jihua). It laid down guidelines for the creation of five “cane sugar production 
districts” (zhetang yingzaoqu) and the establishment of three modern sugar refineries 
in each district.19 Feng’s proposal was submitted to the Guangdong Provincial 
Government in June, and was instantly approved.  
 In setting up the sugar refineries, Chen Jitang benefited from the worldwide 
bankruptcy of industries caused by the Great Depression. He was able to purchase 
equipment and accessories at reduced prices from two competing contractors: the 
Honolulu Iron Works Company of the United States and the Skoda Works Company 
of Czechoslovakia, with the latter offering specially favorable terms of payment (Xian 
Zien, 1987: 251-52). The first two sugar refineries, established at Xinzao and Shitou 
in the Guangzhou district, started to mill sugar cane in December 1934.  
 Surprisingly, Chen Jitang was said to have reaped huge profits from selling 
machine-processed white sugar in the six months before these two refineries went into 
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operation. He had reportedly sent his agents to Hong Kong, who bought huge 
quantities of white sugar from the Taikoo Sugar Refinery at 8.40 yuan per picul. The 
sugar was shipped up the Zhujiang River, reloaded onto Chen’s so-called 
“anti-smuggling fleet” which bypassed the Guangzhou Customs, repacked at the 
Xinzao Sugar Refinery which was still under construction, and sold as the 
government’s “Five Rams Brand” (Wuyangpai) sugar at 19 yuan per picul. In the 
second half of 1934, Chen reaped a profit of 4,000,000 yuan from selling what 
contemporaries sarcastically called “smokeless sugar” (wuyantang), that is, sugar 
produced before the sugar refinery started to mill sugar cane (Xian Zien, 1987: 260; 
Xie Yingming, 1987: 230-31). In late 1935 and early 1936, four more sugar refineries 
were established in Shunde, Dongguan, Huiyang and Jieyang counties. These six 
sugar refineries constituted the principal component of a conglomeration of modern 
government industries set up under Chen’s rule.20  
 With a view to supplying sufficient cane to the sugar refineries, Chen Jitang 
encouraged sugar cane planting by providing loans to needy cane-cultivators who 
were required to sell their harvested cane to the government. To facilitate the sale of 
white sugar, Chen not only imposed heavy duties on imported sugar, but also 
entrusted the sale of white sugar to specially licensed wholesalers and distributors 
who were all required to pay earnest money and to fulfil stipulated business quotas on 
a monthly basis. Sugar sold without the government’s permission was treated as 
smuggled sugar. Ordinances were passed to the effect that all such sugar would be 
confiscated, and the smugglers concerned would be fined 10-40 times the value of the 
sugar confiscated, depending on the number of offences they had committed 
(Guangdong shengying zhetang, 1934: 30-34, 50-51, 67-73). 
 Chen Jitang also guarded his sugar business against private investment in white 
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sugar production. By regulation, no private sugar mills could be set up without 
applying for registration. Capitalization was limited to 50,000 yuan per mill, whereas 
output was limited to three tons per day. Moreover, the use of imported syrup and 
coarse sugar to make white sugar was forbidden (Xian Zien, 1987: 256, 258). The 
limit set on private investment obviously made it impossible for any individuals or 
groups to set up modern sugar refineries in Guangdong, for one such refinery with a 
complete milling outfit would cost at least 1,200,000 yuan (Mo Yinggui, 1987: 311). 
The government sugar refineries thus found no rivals. A survey conducted shortly 
after Chen Jitang’s fall revealed that there were 1,789 private sugar mills operating in 
19 sugar producing counties of Guangdong. They all belonged to the traditional type 
of stone roller sugar cane mills (shizha zheliao) that produced brown sugar only 
(“Guangdongsheng jiben gongye”, 1937: 57, 60-61). 
 There is little doubt that Chen Jitang had made a fortune out of the sugar 
monopoly. Guangdong white sugar found lucrative markets not only in the southwest, 
but also in Shanghai and the entire Yangzi region (Guangzhouqu diyi zhetang 
yingzaochang, 1935: 89-90). The available information unfortunately does not reveal 
how much Chen had earned. In truth, incomes from government industries were kept 
separate from the accounts of the Department of Finance (Qin Qingjun, 1965: 96; 
Chan Kei-on, 1974: 188). It is even doubtful whether such incomes had ever been 
systematically and truthfully recorded. A popular saying in those days, which 
ridiculed the Guangdong army for “feeding on sugar,” nevertheless drove home the 
importance of sugar incomes (Xie Yingming, 1987: 230). 
 A quicker and more convenient way to raise non-tax revenue was the issuance of 
treasury notes and public bonds. They were usually apportioned among various 
counties and municipalities. In the period 1929-32, treasury notes were issued five 
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times (December 1929, July 1930, August 1930, June 1931 and January 1932) and 
public bonds once (April 1932), amounting to 59,500,000 yuan.21 From 1933 to the 
fall of Chen Jitang in July 1936, treasury notes were issued four times (September 
1934, March 1935, July 1935 and November 1935) and public bonds twice (April and 
May 1936), amounting to 48,000,000 yuan.22 The extent to which these treasury notes 
and public bonds were redeemed remains unknown. 
 A final point that merits attention is Chen Jitang’s manipulation of the 
Guangdong Provincial Bank, which enjoyed the right of issuing notes and silver coins 
free from the control of Nanjing. From July 1932 to October 1935, the Bank had 
issued notes and coins amounting to 49,000,000 yuan. When Nanjing abandoned the 
silver standard in early November 1935, Guangdong followed suit because of the 
serious outflow of silver. Chen nevertheless did not adopt the fabi as the legal tender. 
He instructed the Guangdong Provincial Bank to issue new kinds of paper notes for 
Guangdong, and offered a premium of 20% in exchanging silver coins for the new 
bank notes. From late 1935 to mid-1936, the Guangdong Provincial Government had 
purchased 110,330,000 yuan of silver from the public. In the same period, the 
Guangdong Provincial Bank had issued new notes amounting to 192,000,000 yuan 
(Shao Zongchi, 1987: 315-38; Tang Shoumin and Bei Zuyi, 1936: 4).  
 Chen Jitang also borrowed heavily from the Guangdong Provincial Bank. An 
old-timer, who was the Bank’s cashier section chief, remembered at least five 
occasions when Chen asked for money on behalf of the provincial government and 
army general headquarters. A total of 80,000,000 yuan was borrowed from the Bank 
on these five occasions.23 Furthermore, Chen was said to have drawn 7,000,000 yuan 
and HK$3,800,000 from the Bank when he stepped down from office and took flight 
in July 1936 (“Jinhou zhi Yue ju”, 1936: 10). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Chen Jitang’s principal concern was to strengthen and safeguard his regime 
outside the mandate of Nanjing. He could not have maintained his position as “King 
of the Southern Skies” had he not been able to withhold revenues due to the central 
government and spend them in ways he saw fit. This underlay much of the tension 
between Guangdong and Nanjing in the 1930s until Chen’s fall in July 1936, which 
closed the chapter of warlordism in Guangdong.  
 As a “reformist” warlord, Chen Jitang aspired to make Guangdong a showcase: a 
Sun Yatsenist-type model province that would be the pride of Guangdong and the 
envy of the nation. There is little doubt about Chen’s commitment to such an ideal, or 
the sincerity of his promises. This article nevertheless shows that there were serious 
limitations to what Chen could accomplish because of his primary orientation as a 
warlord.  
 Chen’s style of rule was unmistakably arbitrary and coercive, leaving no rooms 
for any sort of compromise. He had little choice; for only by exercising total control 
could he tap resources as he wished in order to finance his war machine. Chen’s 
experience in governing semi-independent Guangdong illustrates that nothing 
mattered more to a warlord than gaining unrestricted access to the sinews of war. This 
was a matter of survival for any warlord regime; everything else was of secondary 
importance. Chen missed no opportunities to augment incomes. Unfortunately, 
increase in revenue was constantly outpaced by increase in military spending. He thus 
had to orchestrate endless revenue-raising campaigns, and tap the source of finance on 
any imaginable occasions. As a result, his regime turned into a revenue-generating 
enterprise that made a mockery of his lofty aspirations.  
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 Chen’s concern for tapping the source of finance did contribute to the promotion 
of industries in Guangdong. Of all government industries established under his rule, 
none enjoyed more acclaim than the sugar industry. Indeed, it was Chen who 
pioneered the production of machine-processed white sugar in China. He proudly 
proclaimed Guangdong’s lead in this respect when the Shitou Sugar Refinery went 
into operation in December 1934 (Guangzhou minguo ribao, 21 December 1934). It 
should be noted, however, that Chen’s sugar refineries were not an unqualified 
success. They failed to give full play to their productive capacity because of 
insufficient sugar cane produced in Guangdong (Xian Zien, 1987: 250), and Chen 
could not expect other provinces to provide him with cheap cane as he had erected a 
high tariff wall around Guangdong to protect its infant industries. This testifies to the 
limits of industrial development under a separatist regime. Besides, Chen’s policy of 
discriminating against private capital stifled local initiatives. It stamped out 
competition and was not conducive to economic growth. 
 Upon the expiration of the grandiose “Three-Year Administrative Plan,” Chen 
Jitang lamented that the masses had benefited little. Out of disappointment, he 
criticized his subordinates for abusing power and performing duties in a perfunctory 
manner (Chen Jitang, 1935: 342-46; 1936: 349-50). One wonders whether Chen 
realized that his own style of rule had encouraged the arbitrary exercise of power, and 
that his methods of governance had sheltered negligent officials from public criticisms. 
He must have realized, however, that he could not afford to lose the support of his 
henchmen, even though he found them in fault. 
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NOTES 
 
 1. Chen recognized the economic advantages of highways, but his primary 
concern for highway construction was to facilitate troop movements, which he 
deemed as crucial for warding off attacks from the outside and maintaining order in 
the province. See Chen Jitang (1933: 203-04). The importance of highways in 
deciding the outcome of war was fully driven home when Zhang Fakui invaded 
Guangdong in 1929. It was the timely completion of the Guangzhou-Huaxian 
Highway that enabled Chen Jitang to deploy his troops quickly and routed Zhang’s 
army near Huaxian. See Deng Yanhua (1929b: 96-97).  
2. Jiangxi ranked second after Guangdong. However, Jiangxi had only built 
9,916 kilometers of highways, and was far lagging behind Guangdong’s 17,587 
kilometers. 
3. For information on banditry in Republican Guangdong, see Guangdong 
wenshi ziliao bianjibu (1997). The contemporary newspaper Guangzhou minguo 
ribao is a rich source for the study of bandit activities and their suppression by Chen 
Jitang. A contemporary slogan highlights the importance of highways in suppressing 
banditry: “The day that witnesses the completion of highway construction is the day 
that bandits are doomed.” See Deng Yanhua (1929b: 98). For an account that 
illustrates the significance of road and highway construction in pacifying the 
bandit-infested region of Xuwen in southwestern Guangdong, see Guangdong wenshi 
ziliao bianjibu (1997: 38-53). 
4. For more information on Chen Jitang’s early military career, see Chen 
Jitang (1974); Lin Huaping (1996); Ling Likun and Lin Kuangdong (1998); Zhong 
Zhuoan (1999). 
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5. Gu Yingfen was Chen Jitang’s long-time patron, and Ma Chaojun was then 
Director of the Guangdong Provincial Department of Reconstruction. Ma recalled 
telling Jiang Jieshi at the meeting that Chen Jitang made the best choice because Chen 
“is honest, reliable and easy to control.” As regards other possible candidates, Ma 
opined that Chen Mingshu “is supercilious and capricious,” whereas Jiang Guangnai 
“is feeble and irresolute” and Xu Jingtang “is inexperienced and aggressive.” Jiang 
Jieshi eventually endorsed Ma’s proposal. Ma also remembered visiting Li Jishen at 
Tangshan. He learned from Wu Zhihui that Li was detained under the charge of using 
public funds in Guangdong to aid the Guangxi army. See Guo Tingyi, Wang Yujun 
and Liu Fenghan (1992: 121-23, 125-26). 
6. Ka Zhishan, captain of the security police at Nanjing, gave a first-hand 
account of Hu Hanmin’s detention and its aftermath (Ka Zhishan, 1986: 1-28). After 
Hu was detained, Jiang Jieshi sent a cipher telegram to Xiang Hanping, a division 
commander under Chen Jitang. In this telegram, Jiang accused Hu of conspiring with 
Chen, and said he was forced to detain Hu as a preemptive move. It is generally 
believed that Jiang had made up this excuse in order to counter criticisms against him. 
See Luo Yiqun (1987: 80-81). 
7. For the two circular telegrams and Jiang’s warnings, see Guangdongsheng 
dang’anguan (1985: 88-97). 
8. According to Chen Mingshu, he was not consulted although he was well 
aware of the anti-Jiang plot. He subsequently left Guangzhou because he feared facing 
the consequence of open opposition to Jiang Jieshi even though he did not take part. 
Besides, he was not in favor of the anti-Jiang move (Zhu Zongzhen, 1997: 68). A 
different account is given by Cheng Tiangu, Chief of the Bureau of Public Works in 
Guangzhou. In his memoirs, Cheng pointed out that Gu Yingfen had sent him to 
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consult with Chen Mingshu several times. According to Cheng, Chen Mingshu was 
actually offered the choice of taking up either military or political leadership in the 
campaign to save Hu Hanmin. Chen, however, regarded the offer as a joke, as he 
knew Chen Jitang was already making military plans and would not budge an inch. 
Chen Mingshu procrastinated and eventually left Guangzhou (Cheng Tiangu, 1993: 
217-18). 
9. Chen Jitang talked about the “Three-Year Administrative Plan” for the first 
time on 14 Sept. 1932 (Chen Jitang, 1932a). For an abstract of the “Three-Year 
Administrative Plan” which Chen submitted to and was endorsed by the Southwest 
Political Council on 17 Sept. 1932, see Chen Jitang (1932b). For the full text of the 
“Three-Year Administrative Plan,” which runs up to 530 pages, see Guangdongsheng 
mishuchu (1933). 
10. In the summer of 1933, three vessels belonging to the Bohai Fleet defected 
to Guangdong. They formed the Guangdong Fleet, as distinct from the Fleet of the 
First Group Army. However, these three vessels left Guangzhou for Hong Kong in 
mid-1935, and were eventually taken over by the Nanjing authorities. See Xu 
Yaozhen (1987: 186-88); Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo (1987: 151-52). 
11. For the minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the Guangdong 
Provincial Government, see Guangdongsheng dang’anguan (1987-89: 3/1-628, 
4/1-391). Chen Jitang attended the 245th meeting on 15 December 1933. This meeting 
passed the budget for the fiscal year July 1933－June 1934, but the reason why Chen 
attended this particular meeting is difficult to ascertain (Guangdongsheng 
dang’anguan, 1987-89: 3/496-97). 
12. For a complete list of these 49 persons who were appointed county 
magistrates, see Guangdongsheng minzhengting (1936: 15-16). For more information 
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on the “advanced political study course,” see Chen Yuceng (1987: 201-07); Zhong 
Zhengjun (1993:48-53). 
13. For a detailed account of the development of local self-government under 
Chen Jitang, see Guangdongsheng mingzhengting (1936: 91-142). In July 1934, on 
the eve of the convening of the Guangdong Provincial Assembly, Lin Yizhong sent 
students of the “advanced political study course” to various counties and 
municipalities to supervise the election of assemblymen. For a discussion of Lin’s role 
in building up Chen Jitang’s power through the local self-government movement, see 
Chen Yuceng (1987: 204-05). 
14. In 1928, the gentry-led local militias were reorganized into “local security 
guard teams” and placed under the county magistrates. Yet, most of these “teams” 
remained under the control of powerful gentry members in the early 1930s. For more 
information on the genesis and development of the “local security guard teams” in 
Guangdong, see Yu Mianqun and Chen Jiefu (1962: 128-45). 
15. For discussion of the finance of Guangdong during the Northern Expedition, 
see Fitzgerald (1990: 745-57); Qin Qingjun (1982: 161-93); Luo Ming (1992: 76-83). 
16. The accounting unit of all national revenue and expenditure was the dayuan 
(national dollar), whereas that of provincial revenue and expenditure was the yuan 
(Guangdong dollar). For the sake of consistency, all tabulations in this article use the 
yuan as the basic monetary unit, the exchange rate between the dayuan and yuan 
being 1:1.3. 
17. Huo Zhiting was a crony of Chen Jitang’s brother, Chen Weizhou. Apart 
from securing the gambling and opium licenses, Huo also managed to procure for his 
son, Huo Baocai, the post of Vice-President of the Guangdong Provincial Bank. For 
more information on Huo Zhitang, see Wu Xiangheng (1987: 325-30). 
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18. For a complete list of those commodities that were subject to the “special 
taxes on foreign agricultural products and miscellaneous items,” as well as their 
respective tax rates, see Guangdongsheng caizhengting (1936). 
19. The five districts were Guangzhou, Huiyang, Chaoshan, Xuwen and 
Qiongya (Hainan Island). See Feng Rui (1934: 2-4). 
20. Modern government industries established under Chen Jitang’s rule, apart 
from the expanded Xicun Cement Factory and the Xinzao, Shitou, Shunde, Dongguan, 
Huiyang and Jieyang Sugar Refineries, included: the Guangdong Textile Factory 
comprising six branches (raw silk, silk goods, linen goods, woolen goods, cotton 
goods and machinery), the Guangdong Chemical Factory comprising two branches 
(sulphuric acid and caustic soda), the Guangdong Fertilizer Factory and the Pajiang 
Arsenal. There were three other factories that were near completion when Chen fell 
from power: the Meilu Linen Goods Factory, the Guangdong Beverage Factory and 
the Guangdong Paper Mill. As regards the originally planned hydroelectric plant and 
the iron and steel mill, they proved too costly and little progress had been made by 
1936. See Xie Yingming (1987: 219-40); Huang Zengzheng (1989: 17-21, 30). 
21. Following are the amounts raised on different occasions: 4,000,000 yuan 
(December 1929), 500,000 yuan (July 1930), 10,000,000 yuan (August 1930), 
10,000,000 yuan (June 1931), 5,000,000 yuan (January 1932) and 30,000,000 yuan 
(April 1932). See Guangdongsheng caizhengting (1934: 3/5-6). 
22. Following are the amounts raised on different occasions: 2,000,000 yuan 
(September 1929), 6,000,000 yuan (March 1935), 5,000,000 yuan (July 1935), 
10,000,000 yuan (November 1935), 10,000,000 yuan (April 1936) and 15,000,000 
yuan (May 1936). For treasury notes, see Guangdongsheng dang’anguan (1987-89: 
4/21, 131, 134, 142, 187, 197, 260). For public bonds, see Guangdongsheng 
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dang’anguan (1995-96: 14/200, 208, 214). 
23. According to this old-timer, Chen had asked for 3,000,000 yuan to expand 
the Xicun Cement Factory, 20,000,000 yuan to develop military reclamation districts, 
10,000,000 yuan to step up air defense, 37,000,000 yuan to put finance in order, and 
8,000,000 yuan to pay his troops on the day before he stepped down from office. See 
Shao Zongchi (1987: 319). 
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